Jung and the Shadow of Fanaticism
Jung and the Shadow of Fanaticism
In my book I sought to explore how Jung used his ideas to explain the mass psychology that drove Germany into the arms of a charismatic psychopath like Hitler. Jung offered explanations that ranged from discussing conventional historical factors to his theories of archetypal mass regression and the adolescent brutality of the Puer archetype. In particular he looked at the political manipulation of religious psychology, and with this I would like to consider how we might use some of his observations to reflect on the present confrontation between the West and some of the Islamic States and their populations.
Looking back on Jung in his historical context, many of the assumptions that commentators have made about Jung's politics have proved to be unfounded or simplistic. On closer examination Jung seems to have been remarkably well informed about the European power politics of his day and he deployed a shrewd 'journalistic' understanding in some of his letters, interviews and essays as he became increasingly concerned about the naivety of Western democracies in the face of the dictatorships and the threat of the chemical arms race. Later in the post-war world he warned repeatedly of the polarising dynamic of the Cold War and the mutual scapegoating that froze European politics for two generations.
In 1927 he warned that people were in danger of being overwhelmed by ideologies and stated, "Our fearsome Gods have only changed their names: they now rhyme with -ism". Jung was equally concerned by the emotional and collective power of religious psychology, which he thought drove mass movements (Jung, 1969[1934/1954], para 125). Later he suggested that "the current 'isms'" roots lay in the "dangerous identifications of the subjective with the collective consciousness. Such an identity infallibly produces a mass psyche with its irresistible urge to catastrophe" (Jung, 1991[1947/54], para 426).
From studying Jung's writings it is clear that he looked at different levels of psychological activity. Looking at German he warned about the German inferiority complex which was a result of their missing the empire-building phase of European history and their defeat in WW1. Another of his observations was about the disruption and emotional violence that is unleashed when long established orders are swept away. He suggested that times of great anxiety "would bring up archaic material, archetypes that join forces with the individual as well as with the people. ...Such an outburst is always a regression into history and it always means a lowering of the level of civilization" (Jung, 1986[1936a], para 1323). He then warned that these feelings would prompt people's desire for a saviour.
Jung realised that charismatic dictators exploited these conditions and many of his pre-war thoughts concentrated on how Hitler manipulated his messianic appeal (McGuire and Hull, 1980, p130). He suggested that this archetypal possession had a survival value as it created strength, conviction, and courage, but these emotional advantages were always bought at a cost. In his 1938 press interview he observed, "There is no question but that Hitler belongs in the category of the truly mystic medicine man." Jung also drew attention to the effect of charismatic leaders and contrasted their 'uncanny' ability to inspire their followers with their very 'grounded' ability to manipulate this misplaced trust.
As I illustrate in the book, from reading Jung's pre-war correspondence it is clear he kept himself as informed as possible about the character of the Nazi leadership. This level of political awareness then had practical repercussions as during the war when he was contacted by elements of the German resistance and later during the war Jung was used as a consultant by the O.S.S American intelligence officer Allen Dulles in Switzerland to advise on likely reactions amongst Hitler and the Nazi elite.
Jung had the impression that Hitler demonstrated deceptively dangerous contrasts. From various sources of information Jung had the impression that Hitler in a social context seemed to be "an ordinary person [who] is a shy and friendly man with artistic tastes and gifts. As a mere man he is inoffensive and modest, and has nice eyes." But Jung explained, once he worked himself into his inflated state, "When the State-spirit speaks through him, he sends forth a voice of thunder and his word is so powerful that it sweeps together crowds of millions like fallen autumn leaves" (Jung, 1986[1936a], para 1326).
Jung's perspective offers useful diagnostic insights, but he was less successful when his theory gave cautious grounds for optimism. For a brief period in the early thirties Jung maintained what I termed the "archetypal hope". He hoped that despite the evils of the Nazi regime, at some level below the surface a hidden Germany would spiritually reinvent itself and overthrow them. By 1933 the rapid consolidation of the Nazi revolution put paid to Jung's archetypal hope and in his post-war writings he shifted his theoretical emphasis in archetypal theory to concentrate on the individual's transformation of their own internal conflicts.
In 1936 as Jung became increasingly pessimistic he tried to articulate his warning about Nazi Germany in Wotan and have it circulated in the Foreign Office, but the democracies lacked the political will to listen to warnings whether they came from Churchill, the German resistance colleagues of Dietrich Bonhoeffer or from Jung. Jung's warnings could also have little impact in Germany where too many people were caught by the nationalistic inflation to resist the intoxication of archetypal messiahs, promised lands and vengeful conflagrations. Thus for the second time in Jung's life Europe was plunged into war.
Many of the same archetypal themes hold sway in the Middle East. In Jung's time, as now, fanatics were willing to exploit Islam for their own ends. Himmler was not only the architect of genocide but also an avid 'spiritual' aspirant. In his 12,000-book library (Hohne, 2000, p151) he immersed himself in his own 'new-age' spiritual Parthenon that included holistic medicine, reincarnation, Karma, the Koran and his admiration of Mohammed. With this bizarre pot-porri Himmler sought to concoct his own mythic 'collective conscious' to fire future generations of the S.S.. Jung came close to guessing this and in 1938 speculated whether at some time in the future Hitler's "religion" might feature "a Moslem-like Valhalla into which worthy Germans may enter" (McGuire and Hull, 1980, p131).
Looking back on Nazi Germany one is dazzled by the inconsistency of the Nazis' exploitation of the Islamic peoples. Their intelligence services exploited Egyptian nationalist sentiments in North Africa, and more sinisterly the Nazis gave refuge to the Palestinian Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Hasseini and awarded him an honorary S.S. colonelcy and a luxury suite in the Hotel Adlon in Berlin from which he could spread his anti-Semitic propaganda. The Nazis were also able to exploit local nationalism and recruit 20,000 Bosnian Muslims to serve in Himmler's atrocity prone Hanschar division in the Balkans (Hale, 2009, p367). Indeed Himmler was very proud of his Muslim troops and had the unrealised hope that they would show an attitude of fearless fanaticism in battle which it might be possible to inculcate in Germans (Kersten, 1956, p72, 73 p156, 39, 152). Yet within the nightmare phantasmagoria of the S.S. empire contradictions abounded. Once the Einsatzgruppen got to work in central Russia, Muslim village communities or Muslim Red army soldiers could meet the same fate as Jews as the killing squads were unwilling or unable to distinguish between the two Semitic peoples (Hilberg, 1961, p223).
If Jung's warnings were ignored then, are we any more capable now of listening to and learning about the dangers of unconscious collective themes?
Maybe to a Western reader these fragments of Balkan history have little more than curiosity value; but in the collective conscious of the Balkans and the Middle East old scores are still killing matters. The Serb militia in Bosnia were paying back scores for previous generations of Croat or Bosnian collaborators.
The cost of ignoring history is high. In the Middle East any possibility of Arab-Israeli reconciliation has been bedevilled over the years by each side's failure to examine their own shadow in the other's eyes or take account of the political complexes of the other side. How many diplomatic opportunities have been squandered by this lack of reflection? One still reads with incredulity of Nasser's use of many of Eichmann's team or the repeated failures of Israeli politicians to account for the importance of "face" in negotiating with the Arab states or Palestinian politicians. The examples maybe morally incompatible, but this should not prevent us from recognising these examples of poor judgment that have had enduring consequences.
Since the end of the Cold War it has been superficially argued that the world is polarised into a clash between the West and Islam. However on closer examination I would suggest that our real concern should be the way the Muslim world is caught in two intermeshed civil wars. On the surface there is the potential for a major regional war with the Shia-Sunni confrontation that preoccupies many of the Arab governments although this is masked by the Israeli-Palestinian war and Al-Qaeda's anti-American agenda that so preoccupy the Western media. But below the surface there is an equally intractable conflict. This other civil war is between the 'modernist' reformers who may also be part of the entrenched power elites and the 'old world' of those concerned to preserve their religious culture from materialistic erosion. It is with the extreme end of the 'old world', where frustrated nationalism blends with medieval fundamentalism, that so many sources of destabilisation lie and they get all the more serious when the Islamisists have access to the resources of a modern state. These destabilising elements range from Al-Qaeda, as the latest incarnation of pan-Arabism, to the grandiose aspirations of Shia Iran.
This 'Kasbah' war is veiled from too much media attention for different reasons by the power elites in East and West. For Muslims there can be a substantial element of denial as there is an explicit prohibition on intra-Muslim conflict in Islam. Instead much of the energy of emotional unrest is displaced into outrage at the Arab-Israeli conflict that serves as a useful distraction for Arab governments keen to draw popular opinion away from local issues.
In the West denial is also at work as we ignore many of the political, social and economic inequalities that destabilize the sources of our oil dependency. In our petro-chemical addiction it is safe for us to concentrate our media attention on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and ignore many flashpoints where we dare not comment for fear of irritating allies: so Russian atrocities in Chechnya go largely ignored as do the problems of the Muslim minorities in China, the Arab minority in Turkey, the fate of the Kurds and many intra-Muslim conflicts from Pakistan to Sudan. Instead of being consistent, the West either silently observes the Muslim civil war and attempts to remain outside the conflict as in Algeria, Egypt and Sudan or intervenes for the sake of oil or drugs. In either case we seem to resolutely fail to address the wider picture and look for both balance and consistency. This lack alienates both sides in many conflicts and undermines our ability to help resolve conflicts and appear as honest brokers.
Given the array of complex issues we face today are there themes that Jung identified that might offer some lessons from the past and help us escape from our denial and our confusions? I would like to refer to five themes that Jung discussed.
The Influence of the Cultural Conscious and Unconscious
Jung attempted to look at long-term cultural factors and was aware of the need to look at both sides of a confrontation. Fear and rage, whatever the cause, are treacherously deceptive intoxicants and politicians have never been slow to exploit others' reactions and delude and channel them for their own ends.
To counter such passions time and patience are vital to help cool tempers. For progress to be possible in South Africa, both sides had to be willing to look at their own faults and consider how they were perceived by the other side before a meeting of minds was possible. We have to be clear of our own shadow and the shadow of the past: as the Russian saying goes, "If one keeps an eye on the past one is blind in one eye. If one keeps no watch on the past one is blind in both eyes!"
The Danger of Charismatic Demagogues
In the thirties Jung criticised the naivety and appeasement of the democracies when faced with the cynical expansionism and aggression of the Nazis. One needs to beware and respond appropriately to charismatic leaders who are over-identified with archetypal themes, as they may be over prone to radical destabilisation. Ideas about messianic leaders and the influence of borderline personality disorders has been developed much further in Jungian circles in Stevens and Price's Prophets, Cults and Madness (2000).
The Danger of Democracy's Fear of Cost and Complexity
Jung stressed the intractability of many problems and after the Second World War noted that while the psychiatrist could successfully treat "dangerous unconscious forces" in the individual... "If it is a whole family, the chances are ten to one against, and only a miracle can provide the remedy. But when it is a whole nation the artillery speaks the final word" (Jung, 1986[1945], para 1377).
Democracy pushes politicians to fear solutions that will be costly and complex and all too often the rushed half measures are infinitely more costly. Promises of quick results are almost invariably fools' gold.
The Importance of Containment, Boundaries and Patience
The West needs to regain its confidence in the wisdom of long-term solutions rather than taking refuge in denial or appeasement. Often one must endeavour to endure and render rogue leaders as powerless as possible until another political generation arises. Another lesson we need to relearn is the need to provide expansionist leaders with clear boundaries. The failure of the allies to prevent Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland and Czechoslovakia are notorious examples, but more recently we have seen how America's well-intentioned confusion over its commitments to Kuwait and to the Albanians encouraged Saddam Hussein's invasion and Slobodan Milosevic oppression in Kosovo.
Many problems are too complex to be open to quick or cheap solutions. Stalin's Russia was successfully met by containment till it transformed itself. Passion must be worked through and this means the West must neither be provoked by terrorism into over-reaction or fall into the opposite danger of listening to the siren song of our fears and take refuge in laziness rationalised as morality.
The Cumulative Importance of Individual Maturity
In conclusion I would like to return to Jung's overriding concern at how individuals were faring in the collective conscious. He wondered whether they were able to hold their own in mass society or were swept along by the demagogues. Then as now, we all live in the political collective, but Jung was clear: if real change is to bear fruit individuals must first work on their own shadows lest their good intentions be subverted. Jung's plea for individuation was central to his theory but this was not the bias of an unworldly analyst cocooned in an ivory tower in Bollingen. Individuation and maturity are vital to humanity if we are to find a way to coexist in all the passions and confusions of our increasingly overcrowded world.
2
In my book I sought to explore how Jung used his ideas to explain the mass psychology that drove Germany into the arms of a charismatic psychopath like Hitler. Jung offered explanations that ranged from discussing conventional historical factors to his theories of archetypal mass regression and the adolescent brutality of the Puer archetype. In particular he looked at the political manipulation of religious psychology, and with this I would like to consider how we might use some of his observations to reflect on the present confrontation between the West and some of the Islamic States and their populations.
Looking back on Jung in his historical context, many of the assumptions that commentators have made about Jung's politics have proved to be unfounded or simplistic. On closer examination Jung seems to have been remarkably well informed about the European power politics of his day and he deployed a shrewd 'journalistic' understanding in some of his letters, interviews and essays as he became increasingly concerned about the naivety of Western democracies in the face of the dictatorships and the threat of the chemical arms race. Later in the post-war world he warned repeatedly of the polarising dynamic of the Cold War and the mutual scapegoating that froze European politics for two generations.
In 1927 he warned that people were in danger of being overwhelmed by ideologies and stated, "Our fearsome Gods have only changed their names: they now rhyme with -ism". Jung was equally concerned by the emotional and collective power of religious psychology, which he thought drove mass movements (Jung, 1969[1934/1954], para 125). Later he suggested that "the current 'isms'" roots lay in the "dangerous identifications of the subjective with the collective consciousness. Such an identity infallibly produces a mass psyche with its irresistible urge to catastrophe" (Jung, 1991[1947/54], para 426).
From studying Jung's writings it is clear that he looked at different levels of psychological activity. Looking at German he warned about the German inferiority complex which was a result of their missing the empire-building phase of European history and their defeat in WW1. Another of his observations was about the disruption and emotional violence that is unleashed when long established orders are swept away. He suggested that times of great anxiety "would bring up archaic material, archetypes that join forces with the individual as well as with the people. ...Such an outburst is always a regression into history and it always means a lowering of the level of civilization" (Jung, 1986[1936a], para 1323). He then warned that these feelings would prompt people's desire for a saviour.
Jung realised that charismatic dictators exploited these conditions and many of his pre-war thoughts concentrated on how Hitler manipulated his messianic appeal (McGuire and Hull, 1980, p130). He suggested that this archetypal possession had a survival value as it created strength, conviction, and courage, but these emotional advantages were always bought at a cost. In his 1938 press interview he observed, "There is no question but that Hitler belongs in the category of the truly mystic medicine man." Jung also drew attention to the effect of charismatic leaders and contrasted their 'uncanny' ability to inspire their followers with their very 'grounded' ability to manipulate this misplaced trust.
As I illustrate in the book, from reading Jung's pre-war correspondence it is clear he kept himself as informed as possible about the character of the Nazi leadership. This level of political awareness then had practical repercussions as during the war when he was contacted by elements of the German resistance and later during the war Jung was used as a consultant by the O.S.S American intelligence officer Allen Dulles in Switzerland to advise on likely reactions amongst Hitler and the Nazi elite.
Jung had the impression that Hitler demonstrated deceptively dangerous contrasts. From various sources of information Jung had the impression that Hitler in a social context seemed to be "an ordinary person [who] is a shy and friendly man with artistic tastes and gifts. As a mere man he is inoffensive and modest, and has nice eyes." But Jung explained, once he worked himself into his inflated state, "When the State-spirit speaks through him, he sends forth a voice of thunder and his word is so powerful that it sweeps together crowds of millions like fallen autumn leaves" (Jung, 1986[1936a], para 1326).
Jung's perspective offers useful diagnostic insights, but he was less successful when his theory gave cautious grounds for optimism. For a brief period in the early thirties Jung maintained what I termed the "archetypal hope". He hoped that despite the evils of the Nazi regime, at some level below the surface a hidden Germany would spiritually reinvent itself and overthrow them. By 1933 the rapid consolidation of the Nazi revolution put paid to Jung's archetypal hope and in his post-war writings he shifted his theoretical emphasis in archetypal theory to concentrate on the individual's transformation of their own internal conflicts.
In 1936 as Jung became increasingly pessimistic he tried to articulate his warning about Nazi Germany in Wotan and have it circulated in the Foreign Office, but the democracies lacked the political will to listen to warnings whether they came from Churchill, the German resistance colleagues of Dietrich Bonhoeffer or from Jung. Jung's warnings could also have little impact in Germany where too many people were caught by the nationalistic inflation to resist the intoxication of archetypal messiahs, promised lands and vengeful conflagrations. Thus for the second time in Jung's life Europe was plunged into war.
Many of the same archetypal themes hold sway in the Middle East. In Jung's time, as now, fanatics were willing to exploit Islam for their own ends. Himmler was not only the architect of genocide but also an avid 'spiritual' aspirant. In his 12,000-book library (Hohne, 2000, p151) he immersed himself in his own 'new-age' spiritual Parthenon that included holistic medicine, reincarnation, Karma, the Koran and his admiration of Mohammed. With this bizarre pot-porri Himmler sought to concoct his own mythic 'collective conscious' to fire future generations of the S.S.. Jung came close to guessing this and in 1938 speculated whether at some time in the future Hitler's "religion" might feature "a Moslem-like Valhalla into which worthy Germans may enter" (McGuire and Hull, 1980, p131).
Looking back on Nazi Germany one is dazzled by the inconsistency of the Nazis' exploitation of the Islamic peoples. Their intelligence services exploited Egyptian nationalist sentiments in North Africa, and more sinisterly the Nazis gave refuge to the Palestinian Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Hasseini and awarded him an honorary S.S. colonelcy and a luxury suite in the Hotel Adlon in Berlin from which he could spread his anti-Semitic propaganda. The Nazis were also able to exploit local nationalism and recruit 20,000 Bosnian Muslims to serve in Himmler's atrocity prone Hanschar division in the Balkans (Hale, 2009, p367). Indeed Himmler was very proud of his Muslim troops and had the unrealised hope that they would show an attitude of fearless fanaticism in battle which it might be possible to inculcate in Germans (Kersten, 1956, p72, 73 p156, 39, 152). Yet within the nightmare phantasmagoria of the S.S. empire contradictions abounded. Once the Einsatzgruppen got to work in central Russia, Muslim village communities or Muslim Red army soldiers could meet the same fate as Jews as the killing squads were unwilling or unable to distinguish between the two Semitic peoples (Hilberg, 1961, p223).
If Jung's warnings were ignored then, are we any more capable now of listening to and learning about the dangers of unconscious collective themes?
Maybe to a Western reader these fragments of Balkan history have little more than curiosity value; but in the collective conscious of the Balkans and the Middle East old scores are still killing matters. The Serb militia in Bosnia were paying back scores for previous generations of Croat or Bosnian collaborators.
The cost of ignoring history is high. In the Middle East any possibility of Arab-Israeli reconciliation has been bedevilled over the years by each side's failure to examine their own shadow in the other's eyes or take account of the political complexes of the other side. How many diplomatic opportunities have been squandered by this lack of reflection? One still reads with incredulity of Nasser's use of many of Eichmann's team or the repeated failures of Israeli politicians to account for the importance of "face" in negotiating with the Arab states or Palestinian politicians. The examples maybe morally incompatible, but this should not prevent us from recognising these examples of poor judgment that have had enduring consequences.
Since the end of the Cold War it has been superficially argued that the world is polarised into a clash between the West and Islam. However on closer examination I would suggest that our real concern should be the way the Muslim world is caught in two intermeshed civil wars. On the surface there is the potential for a major regional war with the Shia-Sunni confrontation that preoccupies many of the Arab governments although this is masked by the Israeli-Palestinian war and Al-Qaeda's anti-American agenda that so preoccupy the Western media. But below the surface there is an equally intractable conflict. This other civil war is between the 'modernist' reformers who may also be part of the entrenched power elites and the 'old world' of those concerned to preserve their religious culture from materialistic erosion. It is with the extreme end of the 'old world', where frustrated nationalism blends with medieval fundamentalism, that so many sources of destabilisation lie and they get all the more serious when the Islamisists have access to the resources of a modern state. These destabilising elements range from Al-Qaeda, as the latest incarnation of pan-Arabism, to the grandiose aspirations of Shia Iran.
This 'Kasbah' war is veiled from too much media attention for different reasons by the power elites in East and West. For Muslims there can be a substantial element of denial as there is an explicit prohibition on intra-Muslim conflict in Islam. Instead much of the energy of emotional unrest is displaced into outrage at the Arab-Israeli conflict that serves as a useful distraction for Arab governments keen to draw popular opinion away from local issues.
In the West denial is also at work as we ignore many of the political, social and economic inequalities that destabilize the sources of our oil dependency. In our petro-chemical addiction it is safe for us to concentrate our media attention on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and ignore many flashpoints where we dare not comment for fear of irritating allies: so Russian atrocities in Chechnya go largely ignored as do the problems of the Muslim minorities in China, the Arab minority in Turkey, the fate of the Kurds and many intra-Muslim conflicts from Pakistan to Sudan. Instead of being consistent, the West either silently observes the Muslim civil war and attempts to remain outside the conflict as in Algeria, Egypt and Sudan or intervenes for the sake of oil or drugs. In either case we seem to resolutely fail to address the wider picture and look for both balance and consistency. This lack alienates both sides in many conflicts and undermines our ability to help resolve conflicts and appear as honest brokers.
Given the array of complex issues we face today are there themes that Jung identified that might offer some lessons from the past and help us escape from our denial and our confusions? I would like to refer to five themes that Jung discussed.
The Influence of the Cultural Conscious and Unconscious
Jung attempted to look at long-term cultural factors and was aware of the need to look at both sides of a confrontation. Fear and rage, whatever the cause, are treacherously deceptive intoxicants and politicians have never been slow to exploit others' reactions and delude and channel them for their own ends.
To counter such passions time and patience are vital to help cool tempers. For progress to be possible in South Africa, both sides had to be willing to look at their own faults and consider how they were perceived by the other side before a meeting of minds was possible. We have to be clear of our own shadow and the shadow of the past: as the Russian saying goes, "If one keeps an eye on the past one is blind in one eye. If one keeps no watch on the past one is blind in both eyes!"
The Danger of Charismatic Demagogues
In the thirties Jung criticised the naivety and appeasement of the democracies when faced with the cynical expansionism and aggression of the Nazis. One needs to beware and respond appropriately to charismatic leaders who are over-identified with archetypal themes, as they may be over prone to radical destabilisation. Ideas about messianic leaders and the influence of borderline personality disorders has been developed much further in Jungian circles in Stevens and Price's Prophets, Cults and Madness (2000).
The Danger of Democracy's Fear of Cost and Complexity
Jung stressed the intractability of many problems and after the Second World War noted that while the psychiatrist could successfully treat "dangerous unconscious forces" in the individual... "If it is a whole family, the chances are ten to one against, and only a miracle can provide the remedy. But when it is a whole nation the artillery speaks the final word" (Jung, 1986[1945], para 1377).
Democracy pushes politicians to fear solutions that will be costly and complex and all too often the rushed half measures are infinitely more costly. Promises of quick results are almost invariably fools' gold.
The Importance of Containment, Boundaries and Patience
The West needs to regain its confidence in the wisdom of long-term solutions rather than taking refuge in denial or appeasement. Often one must endeavour to endure and render rogue leaders as powerless as possible until another political generation arises. Another lesson we need to relearn is the need to provide expansionist leaders with clear boundaries. The failure of the allies to prevent Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland and Czechoslovakia are notorious examples, but more recently we have seen how America's well-intentioned confusion over its commitments to Kuwait and to the Albanians encouraged Saddam Hussein's invasion and Slobodan Milosevic oppression in Kosovo.
Many problems are too complex to be open to quick or cheap solutions. Stalin's Russia was successfully met by containment till it transformed itself. Passion must be worked through and this means the West must neither be provoked by terrorism into over-reaction or fall into the opposite danger of listening to the siren song of our fears and take refuge in laziness rationalised as morality.
The Cumulative Importance of Individual Maturity
In conclusion I would like to return to Jung's overriding concern at how individuals were faring in the collective conscious. He wondered whether they were able to hold their own in mass society or were swept along by the demagogues. Then as now, we all live in the political collective, but Jung was clear: if real change is to bear fruit individuals must first work on their own shadows lest their good intentions be subverted. Jung's plea for individuation was central to his theory but this was not the bias of an unworldly analyst cocooned in an ivory tower in Bollingen. Individuation and maturity are vital to humanity if we are to find a way to coexist in all the passions and confusions of our increasingly overcrowded world.
2
